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FOR RElEASE SUl'IDAY A.M.'S 
April 13, 1969 
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTA~TA) 
A HOLD-FAST ON MISSILE DEPLOYME~fl 
After several years of relative s t ability, the Soviet Union and the 
United States are on the verge of major additional deplovments of nuclear 
missiles. The pressure to proceed with the installation of these nevr sys t ems 
is on in this nation and the indications are that it is on in the Soviet Union. 
It is on despite the fact that each nation can ill-afford the enormous expendi-
tures of these deployments in the light of other national needs. It is on 
even though, for years, both nations have urged arms limitations as the 
better way to national security than the continuance of this appalling 
missile merry-go-round . 
It should be noted, therefore, that during the last months of the 
Johnson Administration and the first months of the present Administration 
the Soviet Union apparentl;r made thr ee overtures which suggested a willingness 
to sit down and discuss a limitation on armaments of various types. In a 
similar vein, President Nixon has stated that he wants to replace the era 
of "confrontation" with the era of negotiations." He has made clear that 
he would prefer the "open-hand" to t he "closed fist" in t he relationship 
of the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Based on Secreta~' Rogers' press conference of April 7, I assume 
that Soviet probings for talks on armaments have received full consideration 
in the Executive Branch. It vrould be my hope that the President,on that 
basis and on the basis of the preparat ions which he has made since taking 
office , would now be ready to set a date certain to open U. s.-Soviet 
discussions. 
I am not suggesting tha c. armaments negotiations should be "linked" 
with a consideration of political differences and t he host of ot her issues 
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which have separated the United States and the Soviet Union for many years. 
Panoramic negotiations of that kind may or may not be fruitful at some point 
in the future. In my view, however, first thing; should come firs t . 
The first thing, in my judgment, is not to be found in the political 
issues of many years standing. Nor is the first thing to be found in arms 
reduction in a general sense which has been under discussion for two decades. 
Rather, the most urgent need is to curb the rising pressure in both count ries 
for another major intensification of the deadly nuclear weapons confront ation . 
The time to respond to Soviet overtures for talks or to take the 
initiative ourselves should be before not after the deployment of new nuclear 
weapons systems , for which the gears are now turning} has gained irreversible 
momentum in both countries. What is needed before all else are U. s.~soviet 
negotiations which, confined to one question, may act to halt these gears 
promptly. What is needed, now, in my judgment, is the negotiation of an agr ee 
ment to hold-fast on the further deployment of nuclear weapons in the Soviet 
Union and the United States . 
If agreement on that single point can be achieved there would be 
created a climate of calm, as in the case of t he aftermath of the Test Ban 
Treaty , which might help to brin~ about solutions of mutual interest to the 
more complex problems of arms-reduct ion as well as the resolution of poli t i-
cal differences. At the least, the immediate result of an agreement to 
hold-fast on further nuclear deployments would be an irr:mense savings of 
resources which would otherwise be diverted into new weapons sys tems in both 
countries over the next few years. Any initiat ive by the President in this 
connection, in rn:v judgment, would be gratefully received, not only bv the 
peoples concerned but by the peoples of t he world. 
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THE ANTI-BALLISTIC-MISSILE 
SYSTEM 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
wish to commend the dlstl.ngulshed Sec-
retary of Defc1 , Mr. Laird, for not ap-
pearing before the Republican National 
Committee today to discuss the question 
of the ABM. 
I wish to express my concern about 
reports I have read In the newspapers to 
the effect that the Democratic National 
Committee has Indicated that the ques-
tion of the ABM might become a part!· 
san Issue. 
I also want to express my concern 
about Republican attempts to make It a 
partisan Issue on the basis of pressures 
which I understand-but cannot prove--
have been In operation during the past 
several days. 
Furthermore, I also wish to express my 
concern about any Democrat in this 
Chamber who attempts to make the 
ABM a partisan polltloa.lissue. 
I am also concerned with committees 
being set up either !or or against the 
ABM and being allied with either party. 
I think they should go their own way, 
make their own case. The Senate will 
make up Its own mind, .either !or or 
agadnst. 
I commend the President, 1! a report 
which I have heard 1s accurate -on the 
statement, attributed to the White House, 
that he contemplates appearing before 
the Nation in defense of his proposal for 
a Safeguard missile system. That Is 
within the area of his responsibllity-
make his case, so to speak. But the point 
I emphasize above all else is thM; this 1s 
not a Republican issue or a Democratic 
Issue. It 1s a national issue which super-
sedes the interests of both parties. It Is 
an issue which has two sides. There are 
meritorious arguments on both-let them 
be heard In the Senate. 
In recent years many Issues of for-
eign relations and military peltcy have 
come before the Senate. That these ques-
tions have been considered In an atmos-
phere free of partisan political consid-
eration reflects great credit on Senators 
of both parties. 
I have no hesitancy 1n this connection 
1n acknowledging a debt to the distin-
guished minority leader <Mr. DIRKSEN) 
and to the entire Republican member-
ship. During the K ennedy and the John-
son administrations, there was no In-
clination on their part to play pelitlcs 
with the Nation's security. Equally, there 
w1ll be no lncllnatlon on the part of the 
majority leadership to play pelttlcs with 
these issues during the current adminls-
trM;!on. 
That Is not to say that there will not 
be differences. There are already dlf. 
ferences even as there were di~rences 
during the past two administrations. 
The differences, however, wlll cut across 
party lines, now, even as they did then. 
That 1s to be expected when complex 
questions confront the l3enate. That 1s 
as It should be when these questions are 
examined In the context of the variety 
of Insights and attitudes which exist 1n 
the Senate. 
The treatment of Vietnam during the 
last administration Ulustrates this point. 
The Senate will recall that policies of 
the Kennedy and Johnson administra-
tions on VIetnam were disputed, 1n the 
first Instance, by Democratic Senators, 
by members of the Democratic majority. 
My own views of disagreement with these 
policies are well known because they were 
expressed publicly 1\Jld, In prtvate, to both 
President Kennedy and President John-
son. Clearly, there was no element of 
politics !nvolvN.I In Democmtlc Senators 
assuming positions of Oi>poslt!on to a 
Democratic administration. 
Distinguished Republ!can Senators, 
however, also formed a most articulate 
and perceptive segment of the opposi-
tion to the spread of the VIetnamese vio-
lence during the previous administration. 
To be sure, the opposition of these Re-
publican Senators was directed at 8 
Democratic administration. They acted, 
however, not out of partisanship but on 
the basis of their high constitutional 
responsibilities. In my judgment, those 
Republican Senators deserve not parti-
san labels but national thanks for their 
contrtbut!on to preventing the com-
pounding of the tragic conflict in Viet-
nam. 
In the same fashion, the crttlcal ex-
amination of the ABM issue has also 
transcended party lines. The opposition 
to this Immensely costly and question-
able military undertaking did not begin 
on January 20 with a Republican admin-
istration. Rather, the opposition had al-
ready reached significant expression-
perhaps over 40 percent of the Senate-
in the last session of the Congress. 
There were Democratic Senators, then, 
who voted their convictions that the De-
epartment of Defense was moving Into 
dubious grounds with the ABM proposal. 
There were Democrats, then, who felt 
and so stated-the distinguished Sena-
tor from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON), for _ 
example--that we would r!sk enormous 
tax funds for what, at the very best, 
would prove an unnecessary piling up of 
useless military hardware. 
In this instance, too, as 1n the case 
of Vietnam, voices of opposition were 
raised on the Republican side of the 
aisle. Indeed, the Initiative which served 
to marshal the opp-osition to the ABM 
came largely from the perceptive and 
articulate arguments of the Senator from 
Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) . 
Why did this distinguished Republican 
speak out? Did he speak as 8 Republican 
to embarrass a Democratic ad.m1nistra-
tlon? Or did he speak as 8 Senator of 
conscience and conviction? Did the Sen-
ator from Kentucky speak as 8 partisan 
politlc:lan or as a former diplomat with 
an Immense knowledge of world affairs? 
And did the distinguished Senator from 
Maine <Mrs. SMITH), the ra.nklng mem-
ber of the minority of the Armed Services 
Committee, in opposing this project last 
year, speak as a partisan politician? Or 
did she speak as one of the Senate's 
ablest experts In mllitary matters, with 
a far longer experience 1n the problems 
of nuclear weaponry than most of the 
Defense Department officials who were 
urging the ABM? 
I need not labor the point. I make the 
point only to underscore the total ab-
sence of partisanship, heretofore, In the 
consideration of the issue of the ABM. 
I make It only because of disturbing re-
pOrts of outside efforts to synthesize a 
political partisanship where, In fact, 
none has existed and where none should 
exist. 
We were, none of us, born yesterday, 
We are, none of us, stra~ers to the more 
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devious byways of the world of politics. 
But the attempt to bring political con-
siderations into this issue by the back-
door of the Senate is not trivial and it 
is most inexcusable. 
What is at stake, here, is not the po-
litical popularity of this administration 
anymore than its predecessor. What is at 
stake here, in the end, are billions of 
dollars of funds-expenditures which 
have been proposed by the Defense De-
partment under consecutive administra-
tions. These are public funds which we 
can 111 afford to waste on superftous im-
practical or irrelevant defenses at a time 
when in.fl.ation and taxes and urgent civil 
demands are pressing heavily upon the 
people of the United States. 
What is sounding in the ABM question 
is not the clarion call to politics in 1970 
or 1972. It is, rather, the call to face 
clearly ln the Senate the issues of peace 
and war-to consider deeply what may 
contribute to the strengthening of peace 
and what may intensify the prospect of 
war. 
That 1s what confronts us, I do not 
know how the Senate will decide this 
issue. I am confident, however, that 
Senators of both- parties will dismiss 
from the consideration of the issue this 
patent attempt to intrude an extraneous 
politics into the constitutional responsi-
bility which devolves upon each Senator 
regardless of his views. 
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield, 1f I have 
time remaining. 
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that I may proceed 
for 5 minutes. 
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
l_ectlon, the Senator from Kentucky is 
recognized !or 5 minutes. 
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I thank 
Senator MANSFIELD for his very generous 
remarks. But I must say that the effort 
1n the Senate to bring before the Con-
gress and the country the merits of the 
proposed ABM system has been led and 
shared by many on both sides of the 
&isle, and certa.inly the le9.dersh1p and 
moral force of the majority leader bas 
been in my view a most important 
factor. 
I share his viewpoint that the ABM 
issue should be removed from the arena 
of pa.rt1sa.n politics, as far as it 1s poosi-
ble. I say-as far as possible-because of 
public tnterest in issues and 1n political 
personalltles make it imP068ible that a 
deba.te 6\lCh as this will be caiTied on 
whol:ly apart from political considera-
tion. And beyond the partisan politics, 
the Executive, as well as Members of 
the Congress who oppose ,,.., 1 support 
this system, has the right ' the duty 
to the coWltry to call for "'lpport. 
But I would caution the na.tlonal 
committees and political organizations, 
whether of the Republican or Democrat-
ic Party, not to appeal for support or op-
pooition to the system because of party 
or support of individuals. A:; Members of 
the Congress deeply concerned about 
this issue which affects our country 
seek to make their decision, partisan 
efforts do not help and 1n my judgment 
wlli backfire. 
This debate lnvol L the question of 
national security, which no responsible 
person of either party would want to 
compromise. Beyond the question of 
whether deployment against some sud-
den or immediate danger which in my 
view has not been satisfied, Is the larger 
issue of determining the elements of se-
curity in a wo!"ld of nuclear weapons 
and the question of deployment concerns 
its effect on negotiations with the So-
viet Union on control of nuclear weap-
ons, for which the President is striving. 
The question of whether such arrange-
ments are possible is always a doubtful 
one. but the very nature of our system 
of government demands always that we 
make the effort. A sensible ground upon 
which we can expect an opportunity to 
reach such an accord is that our inter-
ests in this case are mutual. The Soviets 
are unpredlcable, but like the United 
States we cannot consider that they want 
to be destroyed. 
We must consider the effect of the 
continued escalation of defensive and of-
fensive nuclear weapons. Wlll their con-
tinued development cause the balance of 
tenor to beco!Ile an imbalance of tenor 
with increased danger that one natior 
may try a preemptive strike? This con-
dition would create a sense of fear, and 
certainly a sense of futility, particularly 
among the young people of our country 
who would like to live their lives in a 
peaceful world, at least relatively peace-
ful, and one not overhung by the threat 
of a nuclear race and a nuclear war. I 
do not suppose that any of us, young or 
old, want a nuclear weapons system 
hanging over us--and to live in mind 1f 
not in fact, like our ancient ancestors in 
caves. It may be there is no other way, 
but I am constrained to believe that rea-
son can prevail. 
When Senator HART, of Michigan, and 
I introduced an amendment last year to 
postpone the deployment of the ABM 
system, joined by Members of the Sen-
ate, both Republicans and Democrats, 
we did so that the Senate, the Congress 
and the country would have the chance 
to fully examine its merits and the 
necessity of its deployment. Throughout 
last year as Senator HART and I per-
sisted ln the submission of amendments, 
joined always by a bipartisan group and 
as others Introduced amendments-sen-
ator YOUNG of Ohio, Senator NELSON of 
Wisconsin, Senator CLARK of Pennsyl-
vania-continuing debate had the effect 
we had desired-submission of the issue 
on its merits to the country. 
The debate has brought forward many 
versions of the purpose of the system-
whether against a Chinese or Soviet 
threat, whether to protect our missile 
sites, whether for a mixed population and 
missile site protection, or whether to 
strengthen the hand of our country In 
negotiations with the Soviet Union. Each 
of these purposes has been questioned at 
times both by proponents and opponents. 
But the debate has been upon the 
merits and not upon partisan grounds. 
The elected leadership of both the ma-
jority and the minority and other Mem-
bers of the Senate have taken their posi-
tions on the mel1ts and some are op-
ponents and some are proponents of the 
system. 
I hope this Is the way it will oontinue 
and that the decision In the Congress 
wm be made upon the merits. I continue 
to hope that the President will establish 
a committee such as Dr Killian recom-
mended, which working with the execu-
tive branch will provide the best Judg-
ment of the best informed minds of our 
country upon the issue. and that a judg-
ment wlll result which would have the 
support of the great maJority, perhape 
an overwhelming majority, of our people. 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
suggest the absence of a quorum. 
The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will 
call the roJl. 
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll. 
Mr MANSFIELD. Mr President, I ask 
unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER <Mr. 
EAGLETON in the chair). Without objec-
tion, it is so ordered. 
MISSILE DEPLOYMENT 
Mr MANSFIELD. Mr. President, as 
long as no Senator seems to be endeavor-
ing to get recognition at this time, I 
should like to read a statement which I 
made on Saturday, so that It will be a 
part of the record of my position on the 
ABM: 
A HOLD-FAST ON MISSILE DEPLOYMENT 
After several years o! relative stability, the 
Soviet Union and the United States are on 
the verge ol major a.ddltlona.l deployments 
ol nuclear mlslllles. The proosure to proceed 
wl th the Install a. tlon or these new sys terns 
Ill on ln this nation and the Indications are 
that lt Is on In the Soviet Union. It Is on 
despite the fact that ea<:h nation can Ill-
afford the enormous expPndltures ol these 
deployments in the light or other national 
needs. It 1B on even though, lor years, both 
nations have urged ariJlJ! limitations as the 
better way to national security than the 
continuance ot this appalling missile merry-
go-round. 
It should be noted therefore, that during 
the last months of the Joh.nSon Administra-
tion a.nd the tl.rst month.• or the present 
Admlnistratlon the Soviet Union apparently 
made three overtures which suggested a will-
Ingness to slt down and discuss a limitation 
on armaments of various types. In a similar 
vein, President Nlron has ttated that he 
wants to replace the era ol "conrrontatlon"' 
with the era ol "n('gotlatlons." He has made 
clea.r that he would prefer the "open-hand"' 
to the "cloeed fist" In the relationship of the 
United States and the Soviet Union. 
Based on Secretary Roger~· press confer-
ence of April 7, I assume that Soviet probings 
for talks on armaments t.ave received full 
consideration In the Executive Branch. 
I quote !rom that pr•ss conference, at 
which time Secretary ol State Rogers WM 
asked whether there was anything standing 
In the way o! the s trategic arms limitation 
talks. He gave this answer· "No. there Is 
nothing that stands In the way and they 
can go rorwnrd very soon. We are In the proc-
ess or preparing for them now and we expect 
they will begin In the late spring or early 
summer." 
It would be my hope that the President. on 
that ba.sla and on the ba..•ls ol the prepara-
tions which he has made since taking omce, 
would now be ready to set a date certain to 
open U.S.-Sovlet discussions. 
I am not suggesting that armaments nego-
tiations should be "linked" with a consldera-
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tton of polltlce.I d1tferences e.nd. the hoot o! 
other Issues which have separated the United 
States and the SOviet Union tor many yeara. 
Panoramic negottatton.o of that klnd may or 
may not be trutttul at some polnt 1n the 
future. In my view, however, first th.lnga 
ehouM come first. 
The finlt thing, 1n my judgment, Is not to 
be found 1n the political l.ssues of many years 
Btandlng. Nor Is the first thing to be found 
1n arms reduction 1n a general sense which 
haB been under dtaCUsslon tot: two decades. 
Rather. the most urgent need 1s to curb the 
r1s1ng pressure 1n both countries tor another 
major 1ntensl11catlon of the deadly nuclear 
weapons confrontation. 
The time to respond to Soviet overtures 
for talks or to take the lnltlatlve ourselves 
Bh<>uld be before not after the deployment 
o! new nuclear weapons systems, !or which 
the gears are now turning, has ge.Ined Ir-
reversible momentum 1n both countries. 
Whst is needed before all else are U.S.-Boviet 
negotiations which. confined to one qeustlon, 
may act to halt these gears promptly. What 
ls needed, now, In my judgment, Is the nego-
tiation of an agreement to hold-fast on the 
further deployment of nuclear weapons 1n 
the Soviet Union and the United States. 
I1' agreement on that slngle 'polnt can be 
acllleved there would be created a climate of 
calm, a.s 1n the case of the atterm.ath of the 
Test Ba.n Treaty, which might help to bring 
about solutions of mutual interest to the 
mO!'e complex problems ot arms-reduction as 
well sa the resolution of po!ltlcal d1fference11. 
At the least, the Immediate result o! an 
agreement to hold-fast on further nuclear 
deployments would be an Immense savings 
ot resources which would otherwise be di-
verted lnto new weapons systems 1n both 
countries over the next few years. Any Initia-
tive by the President 1n th1s connection, ln 
my Judgment, would be gratefully received, 
nat only by the peoples concerned but by t~ 
peoples o! the world. 
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of 
a quorum. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk 
w1ll call th c roll 
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 
objection, it is so ordered. 
April 14, 1969 
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